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Abstract
We study distributional (“social”) preferences in adolescent peer networks. Using
incentivized choices between allocations for themselves and a passive agent, children
are classified into efficiency-loving, inequality-loving, inequality-averse, and spiteful
types. We find that pairs of students who report a friendship link are more likely to
exhibit the same preference type than other students that attend the same school. The
relation between types is almost completely driven by inequality-loving and spiteful
types. Further analyses suggest that preference peer networks are mainly formed by
selection into the network and, to a smaller degree, by preference transmission. The
role of peer networks in explaining distributional preferences goes beyond network
composition effects. A low rank in academic performance and a central position
within the network relate positively to a higher likelihood of being classified as spiteful.
Hence, social hierarchies seem to be correlated with distributional preference types.
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1. Introduction
Many people have non-selfish preferences over distributions of economic resources.
These preferences are often synonymously called social preferences, other-regarding
preferences, or distributional preferences (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels,
2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Camerer, 2003; Almås et al., 2010). Their existence
and their specific nature are very important for economic behavior and outcomes,
such as, among many others, cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Fischbacher &
Gachter, 2010), productivity (Carpenter & Seki, 2011; Bandiera et al., 2005; Dohmen
& Falk, 2011), political preferences (Fisman et al., 2017; Kerschbamer & Müller,
2020), and well-being (Becker et al., 2012).1 Recent studies have documented the
evolution of these distributional attitudes in adolescence, from more malevolent at
young age to more benevolent when growing older. They have also stressed the large
degree of individual heterogeneity of distributional preferences (Fehr et al., 2013;
Almås et al., 2010; Martinsson et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2018).
There are much fewer studies on the effects of the social environment and peers on
distributional preferences (Charness & Kuhn, 2007; Gächter et al., 2013; Fatas et al.,
2018; Bicchieri et al., 2019). In particular, we know little about the early-life-peer
influence on the emergence of distributional preferences and whether distributional
preference networks in adolescence exist at all. To fully understand how distribu-
tional preferences are shaped in adolescence, it seems relevant to take the close social
environment and its potential influence into account. Adolescent peer networks could
be crucial in explaining adult inter-individual heterogeneity in distributional prefer-
ences, selection into friendship/professional networks, and political views later in life,
on top of potential biological determinants (Balafoutas et al., 2012; Fisman et al.,
2017).
Preference networks exist if preferences are correlated between members of social
units, such as a child’s school or group of friends, beyond what is expected by the
population preference distribution. Peer correlation in preferences can arise from se-
lection into social networks whose members have similar preferences as one’s own, and
through preference transmission (peer effects). Besides composition, an adolescent’s
position within the social network could itself be related to specific distributional
preferences transmitted through various mechanisms. The potential impact of peer
networks that are based on other-regarding attitudes goes beyond differential evolu-
1In particular, Fisman et al. (2017) find that individuals’ position along the efficiency-equality
trade-off corresponds to their political attitude along the right- and left-wing dimension in the 2012
US presidential election. Similarly, Kerschbamer & Müller (2020), using the same experimental
measure of distributional preferences as our study, show that individuals in Germany classified
as selfish preference types tend to vote more likely for the extreme right, while inequality-averse
subjects tend to favor more left-wing oriented parties. Other relations between social preferences
and real life outcomes have more normative implications: Kerschbamer et al. (2019) document that
altruistic (efficiency-maximizing) types in their lab-experiment in Austria are more likely to by
averse to lying. Carpenter & Seki (2011) find that cooperative and efficiency-maximizing fishermen
in Japan are more productive, when their production requires cooperation. Finally, Kerschbamer
et al. (2016) show that sellers with partially or fully selfish preferences can lead to inefficient
outcomes in creedence good markets.
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tion of these preferences. If children are surrounded by like-minded peers, cognitive
and noncognitive abilities could also develop on different trajectories as a result of
differences in cooperation and support within the network (Cunha et al., 2010; Thöni
& Gächter, 2015).
This paper investigates the distributional (“social”) preferences of children at pri-
mary schools in urban Tanzania and the role of peers in shaping these distributional
preferences. We conduct a lab-in-the-field (artefactual) experiment and analyze to
what extent distributional preferences of children are related to those of their peers
at school, and what roles peer networks, school performance, and popularity play in
explaining distributional preferences. The experiment involves choices between pairs
of allocations that vary how much to allocate to oneself and to an anonymous passive
agent (Kerschbamer, 2015). The variation in inequality in agents’ payoffs across allo-
cations in the choice sets allows us to classify children into four broad distributional
preference types: efficiency-loving, inequality-loving, inequality-averse, and spiteful.
To study the prevalence and relation of these types in peer networks, we ask children
to name and rank their three best friends. Background characteristics from a survey
and school grades from administrative data sources provide additional information.
The four distributional preference types that are used here capture a large set of
potential distributional preferences under very mild assumptions (see Kerschbamer,
2015). Efficiency-loving preferences pertain to utility functions that put emphasis
on the maximum of the sum of payoffs (also called “surplus maximizing motives”).
Inequality-averse preferences put disutility on inequality, whereas inequality-loving
preferences put positive utility on inequality. Finally, spiteful preferences capture a
disutility that is increasing in the payoffs of others (also called “competitive prefer-
ences”).
Our findings show that the majority of children exhibit choices consistent with
inequality averse (30.6%) and spiteful (42.5%) preferences. This pattern stems from
a reluctance to accept disadvantageous allocations for oneself, even if they are Pareto
improving. If two children at the same school report a friendship link, they are 7.9%
more likely to exhibit the same preference type than otherwise. This peer correlation
in types is mainly driven by inequality-loving (+52%) and spiteful types (+11.9%). In
other words, we show that, conditional on reporting a friendship link, distributional
preference types of children are strongly related. Even after controlling for a range
of observable characteristics, having one additional friend of the inequality-loving or
spiteful type increases the likelihood of a child being of the same type by 4.5% (0.1
SD) and 5.2% (0.2 SD), respectively.
Similarity in distributional preference types in peer networks differs by gen-
der, with boys showing stronger correlation coefficients for spitefulness and girls
for inequality-loving preferences. Using several empirical strategies that exploit the
direction (degree centrality) of friendships, differences in exposure to peers, and
best-friend pair fixed effects, we provide tentative evidence for the causal mechanism
behind our main results: both selection into networks and preference transmission
through peers contribute to the observed effects, with the former seemingly being
more important for the compound effects.
Finally, our analysis shows that, besides network composition, the importance
3
of the role of peers in explaining distributional preferences is linked to the position
within the network. Worse relative performance in school relates positively to spiteful
attitudes. The spiteful prefence type is also more common when a child is central
or popular within their peer networks. This suggests an importance of both social
hierarchies and relative economic (human capital) position.
The are at least three contributions in this paper. First, we investigate the role
peer networks play in shaping children’s distributional preferences. Thus, our results
contribute to a better understanding of the evolution of preferences with age, as well
as their impact on (economic) outcomes. If they exist, social preference networks
might reinforce individual predispositions for distributional preferences and, subse-
quently, affect later-life outcomes, for instance, in the labor market (Balafoutas et al.,
2012; Kocher et al., 2013).2 Also with children, educational and social outcomes may
be affected by the composition of distributional preferences in their peer groups. Lei-
der et al. (2009) show that altruism of university students is correlated with that
of their peers.3 Although we cannot conclusively answer the question regarding the
relative impact of ex ante (“selection effects”) versus ex post (“transmission effects”)
similarity in social preferences of groups in our experimental setup, we provide solid
evidence for the presence of both transmission of and selection according to prefer-
ences within social networks. This is in line with the findings of Girard et al. (2015),
who document that risk and time preferences, as well as cooperativeness, are robust
predictors of network formation and network structure for newly admitted under-
graduate students in Germany. It also matches the findings of Leider et al. (2010),
who show that peer correlations in preferences cannot be explained by individuals’
actual awareness of their friends’ attitudes in college.
Second, we investigate the relationship between social hierarchies in networks
and social preferences at a young age. An individual’s relative position within the
social network may itself be related to distributional attitudes. We complement
the view that parents’ socioeconomic status relates to the child’s social preferences
(Benenson et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2019) by exploring the structure of the child’s
own social network and its relationship to distributional preferences. If children who
are disadvantaged in terms of school performance or who are less popular among
peers adopt antisocial attitudes toward peers, such attitudes could be reinforced and
persistently shape outcomes of future interactions. Alternatively, in line with Girard
et al. (2015), social structure and centrality in the social network can originate from
individual preferences of children.
Third, the documentation of nuanced measures of distributional preferences at a
young age in a low-income context complements a series of studies that examine dis-
tributional preferences of children in high-income contexts (Fehr et al., 2013; Almås
et al., 2010; Martinsson et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2018). By adopting the design pro-
2Balafoutas et al. (2014) show in an experiment with adult participants that individuals and
small unitary teams that are assembled randomly exhibit different distributional attitudes and that
the composition of groups in terms of individual preference types determines the group type.
3Both Fehr et al. (2013) and Leider et al. (2009) document the existence and emergence of
parochialism — that is, benevolent attitudes toward members of one’s social group. In the present
study, we do not distinguish between directed and undirected other-regarding concerns.
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posed by Kerschbamer (2015), we elicit and nonparametrically identify all previously
discussed archetypes of other-regarding preferences, using a single allocation experi-
ment. Distributional preferences in a setting of scarce financial resources, ethnic and
religious diversity, and in absence of a welfare state may be of particular interest.
Additionally, in an environment with high overall gender inequality, gender-specific
preference formation at a young age may play an important role in explaining per-
sistent outcome differences between males and females.4 We therefore complement
previous studies on overall and gender-specific distributional preferences of children
(Benenson et al., 2007; Almås et al., 2010; Martinsson et al., 2011; Fehr et al., 2013;
Sutter et al., 2018; Falk et al., 2019).5
Combining distributional preferences and social networks might ultimately pro-
vide a workable theory of reference groups. Standard models of distributional pref-
erences remain silent on how reference groups are formed. Our results are a first
step, and they show that empirical inference on reference group (network) formation
is not easy, but that it can be achieved in an environment in which there is enough
control. Schools are almost perfect laboratories in this sense, allowing us not only
to study the emergence of distributional preferences, but also to learn more about
general aspects of network formation along distributional preferences.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present our
theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the sample that we use, Section 4 describes
the experimental design in more detail, Sections 5–6 present our results, and Section
7 concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we provide a theoretical mapping for our experimental design to
motivate why we might observe that pairs of children who report a friendship link
have a higher probability of exhibiting the same preference type than other children
who attend the same school. We lay out a simple extension of the workhorse model
for intergenerational transmission of preferences by Bisin & Verdier (2001) where
horizontal preference adoption may differ between the general population and the
close social environment. Consider a child i with distributional preference type t,
4Tanzania ranks 125 out of 155 countries in the United Nations Development Programme’s
Gender Inequality Index. At the primary school level, the Southern and Eastern African Consortium
for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) stated for Tanzania that girls tend to underachieve
compared to boys, especially in reading and mathematics (SACMEQ, 2011).
5Fehr et al. (2013) elicit egalitarian, altruistic, and spiteful attitudes in 8- to 17-year-old pupils
in Austria and find strong concerns for equity (39%) and towards others (40%) in the age group of
our study. They further show that particularly at a young age, girls favor equality, while boys show
an overproportional tendency towards spitefulness. In their studies among students in Austria from
a similar age group as the one in this paper, using a series of allocation games, Martinsson et al.
(2011) and Sutter et al. (2018) also find higher equality concerns in girls and efficiency-orientation in
boys. Finally, Almås et al. (2010) show that efficiency concerns and inequality acceptance develop
in adolescence. Studying children at an even younger age, Fehr et al. (2013) provide evidence
for the emergence of equality preferences from selfishness in early life, and Benenson et al. (2007)
document lower levels of altruism for children with low socioeconomic status in the UK, a finding
confirmed by Falk et al. (2019) for Germany.
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where t = {1...K} and a friend d with type td. With some probability q(td) the
two children reveal the same preference type due to the distribution of types in the
reference population. This likelihood depends on the fraction of that specific type
in the reference population of the child, in our case: the school. With an additional
probability p, the child exhibits the same type as the friend due to reasons unrelated
to the overall type distribution at the school:
ti = (p + q(td)) · td + (1 − p − q(td)) · tk (1)
with tk 6= td.
Different mechanisms may explain a positive probability p 6= 0. Children may
select their friends by matching on observable and unobservable characteristics, in
particular their distributional preferences (ex ante similarity, s), i.e., they choose to
form friendships with other students that have similar distributional attitudes. Chil-
dren might also be influenced by the attitudes of their peers, such that distributional
preferences could be transmitted through friends (ex post similarity, r). Preference
transmission refers to any influence on the preference ex post to the formation of
a friendship link and comprises unconscious assimilation, conscious imitation and
directed socialization efforts by friends. Peer correlation in distributional prefer-
ences can therefore be decomposed into selection and preference transmission, which
contribute with distinct weights w and 1 − w to the overall probability.
p = ws + (1 − w)r (2)
Our main interest here is to first estimate p, the correlation coefficient between
the preference types of children and their friends jointly with and independently from
the share of types in the reference population q(t).6 Empirically this is achieved by
sampling the peer networks of the entire reference population at the friendship dyad
level. A positive p suggests that correlation in preferences between friends goes
beyond q. Notice that the correlation is likely to vary by preference type: p(t) 6= p
for all t. This means that peer correlation may be preference type specific.
3. Sample and Data
We elicited distributional preferences of students through a lab-in-the-field experi-
ment at public primary schools in Ilala District, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, at the
beginning of the new school year in early 2018. In collaboration with the District
Educational Office, we randomly chose 3 out of 112 schools for participation.7 The
experimental sessions took place on a single day per school during lecture hours. All
6For simplicity, we do not endogenize the distribution of types in the reference population,
which theoretically can depend on the strength of the horizontal transmission mechanism between
children.
7The sample schools are average sized in terms of the number of classrooms and students. The
sample contained participants from Kibaga (177 standard-6 students), Mtakuja (271), and Maarifa
(264) primary schools.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Background Characteristics Mean SD
Age of child 12.67 (1.078)
Female 0.523 (0.500)
Household size 5.346 (1.999)
Number of children in hh 2.616 (1.304)
Muslim 0.596 (0.491)
School grade 458.6 (123.3)
Rank in school 0.496 (0.288)
Peer Networks
Number of total friends 5.614 (2.128)
Number of out-degree friends 2.803 (0.463)
Number of in-degree friends 2.811 (2.016)
Number of reciprocal friends 1.137 (0.949)
Observations 650
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the experimental sample. School grade and rank come
from the results of the national exam for grade 5, taken one month before the study. The school grade
represents the grade point sum for all ten subjects: Swahili, English, mathematics, science, geography,
civic education, history, art/handicraft, communication/informatics/ICT, and physical education. Rank in
school is the ranking of a student of grade 6 at a given school divided by the number of grade 6 students
at that school. Out-degree denotes the number of friendships reported by a student. In-degree denotes the
number of friendship ties directed toward a student (i.e., reported by peers). Reciprocal friends imply that
two students independently listed each other as friends.
present standard 6 (out of 7) students (age 12–13) participated.8 The total sample
contains 650 students, representing more than 90% of eligible students. In contrast
to experiments in previous studies conducted with children after school hours, we
had very little to no attrition and no selection effects into the experiment.
At the beginning of each session, students were randomly allocated to classrooms
by drawing numbers. After a short survey to collect background characteristics and
elicit the students’ friend networks, pen-and-paper choice list experiments for distri-
butional preferences and a money-earlier-or-later experiment were conducted.9 The
preference experiments took place in random chronological order and were accom-
panied by randomly rotating teams of enumerators.10 Students could earn money
from experimental payoffs. At the end of the session, either the distributional or the
time preference experiment was randomly chosen for payout, which led to guaranteed
earnings between TZS 3,000 (US$1.35) and 8,000 (US$3.59), a significant amount of
pocket money for these students, particularly given the low opportunity costs.11
In the short survey, students were asked to list and rank their three best friends
8Primary school education in Tanzania is mandatory and free of tuition. Students attend for
seven years (standards 1–7) at ages 7–14.
9The child survey and experimental session were embedded in a larger study that included a
family survey and decision-making experiments conducted with parents of some the children in the
sample.
10The team of enumerators consisted of graduate students from the University of Dar es Salaam
who are experienced in conducting surveys in the area and are native Swahili speakers. All survey
and experiments were conducted in Swahili.
11Exchange rate: US$1 = TZS 2,230 (December 2017).
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within their cohort at the school. Using this information, we can construct the
self-reported social networks of students. Within this network structure, various
centrality measures, such as degree or eigenvector centrality, can be defined according
to standard measures.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of student and network characteristics for
the experimental sample. Approximately half of the participants are female and a
large proportion are Muslim, with the remaining 40.4% mostly of Christian faith.
Reassuringly, the mean normalized student rank based on the overall grade by school
is 0.5, which suggests we did not oversample students with good or bad grades. Social
networks in the sample consist on average of 5.6 peers, and an average student
is named 2.8 times by friends. The friendship measures are bounded by the fact
that only three friends per student were elicited. High standard deviations in these
variables suggest that there is large heterogeneity in popularity across students.
4. Experimental Design and Definitions
The experimental design to elicit distributional preferences is based on Kerschbamer
(2015).12 The exact design of the experiments and the empirical strategy were regis-
tered as a preanalysis plan prior to the fieldwork.13 Students were asked to make ten
binary choices between two payoff allocations. Each allocation consists of a payoff for
the decision-maker (the active agent) and a randomly matched anonymous person
(the passive agent).14 One of the two allocations in each choice situation always gives
equal payoffs to both agents (symmetric allocation). The other allocation is asym-
metric, with higher payoffs for the active agent in half of the choices (advantageous
block) and vice-versa in the other half (disadvantageous block). The symmetric al-
location remains constant in all ten choices, while the asymmetric allocation in both
blocks increases in the payoff for the decision-maker (the active agent). The changes
in the asymmetric payoffs represent a change in the cost of giving to (taking from)
the passive agent.
Table 2 shows the chosen ten-item choice list design. The translated version used
in the experiment is found in Appendix C. The constant symmetric (egalitarian)
allocation (right) is fixed at TZS 2,500 for both agents for the ten choices. In the
five rows of the disadvantageous inequality block (DIB), the decision-maker faces
lower payoffs than the passive agent (TZS 4,000) in the asymmetric allocation (left).
Over the five choices, the payoff to the active agent increases monotonically from
TZS 2,000 to 3,000. In the five rows of the advantageous inequality block (AIB),
the decision-maker faces greater payoffs than the passive agent (TZS 1,000) in the
asymmetric allocation (left). Over the five choices, the payoff to the active agent
12The design allows for the identification of nine nuanced preference types. For simplicity, we
focus on four broader types, as in Balafoutas et al. (2014).
13Available online at www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2682. Any changes from the registered
preanalysis plan are discussed in Appendix E.
14No information on the identity or characteristics of the passive agent (such as gender) were
revealed to the active agent. However, the matching was within the sample of participating students
at a given school, and this was common knowledge.
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Table 2: Choice list
Disadvantageous Inequality Block (DIB)
Left Choice Right
You get Passive agent gets You get Passive agent gets
1 2,000 4,000 © © 2,500 2,500
2 2,400 4,000 © © 2,500 2,500
3 2,500 4,000 © © 2,500 2,500
4 2,600 4,000 © © 2,500 2,500
5 3,000 4,000 © © 2,500 2,500
Advantageous Inequality Block (AIB)
Left Choice Right
You get Passive agent gets You get Passive agent gets
6 2,000 1,000 © © 2,500 2,500
7 2,400 1,000 © © 2,500 2,500
8 2,500 1,000 © © 2,500 2,500
9 2,600 1,000 © © 2,500 2,500
10 3,000 1,000 © © 2,500 2,500
Notes: This table presents the choice list provided to subjects (for the actual version used in the experiment, see Figure C.1 in
Appendix C). In each of 10 rows, subjects are asked to choose between two pairs of allocations (left or right). These pairs denote
payoffs to the subject and to an anonymous passive agent from the same school. Payoffs are in Tanzanian shillings (TZS), US$1=TZS
2230
increases monotonically from TZS 2,000 to 3,000, as in the DIB.
Since the payoff to the decision-maker on the left side increases from row to
row, a rational participant should switch only from right to left and only once per
block. A rational participant can also always choose left or right. The pattern of
choices in the blocks determines the classification of distributional preferences. In
particular, the choices reveal benevolence or malevolence toward the passive agent
in the disadvantageous and advantageous domains.
Benevolence means that the decision-maker is giving up his or her own payoff to
increase the passive agent’s payoff. For example, choosing left already at row 1 in
the DIB reveals that the decision-maker is willing to pay at least TZS 500 to increase
the passive agent’s payoff by 1,500 compared with the symmetric allocation. In the
AIB, switching from right to left at row 9, 10, or never also implies benevolence.
Malevolence means that the decision-maker is willing to give up own payoff to
decrease the passive agent’s payoff. Switching to the left in the DIB at row 4 or
5 reveals malevolence. For example, never switching implies a willingness to pay
at least TZS 500 to decrease the passive agent’s payoff by TZS 1,500. In the AIB,
switching to left at row 6, 7, or 8 also implies malevolence.
More precisely, the definitions of benevolence and malevolence in the two do-
mains lump together strict and weak forms. A weakly benevolent decision-maker
increases the passive agent’s payoff by choosing left at row 3 at no cost, while a
weakly malevolent individual renounces doing so by choosing left at row 8.
Table 3 clarifies how a choice sequence translates into the active agent’s willing-
ness to pay (WTP) to increase/decrease the passive agent’s payoff by TZS 1. Since
the choice list structure of the experiment only allows us to identify WTP intervals,
the midpoint is used as a proxy. The signs of the WTP in the AIF and DIB classify
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Table 3: Revealed willingness-to-pay and distributional preference types
Disadvantageous Inequality Block (DIB)
Subject chooses left WTP WTP proxy WTP sign Revealed attitude
for first time in row w
1 0.33 ≤ w < ∞ 0.33 >0 Benevolent
2 0.06 ≤ w < 0.33 0.2 >0 Benevolent
3 0 ≤ w < 0.06 0.03 >0 Benevolent
4 −0.06 ≤ w < 0 -0.03 <0 Malevolent
5 −0.33 ≤ w < −0.06 -0.2 <0 Malevolent
Never −∞ < w < −0.33 -0.33 <0 Malevolent
Advantageous Inequality Block (AIB)
Subject chooses left WTP WTP proxy WTP sign Revealed attitude
for first time in row
6 −∞ < w < −0.33 -0.33 >0 Malevolent
7 −0.33 ≤ w < −0.06 -0.2 >0 Malevolent
8 −0.06 ≤ w < 0 -0.03 >0 Malevolent
9 0 ≤ w < 0.06 0.03 <0 Benevolent
10 0.06 ≤ w < 0.33 0.2 <0 Benevolent
Never 0.33 ≤ w < ∞ 0.33 <0 Benevolent
Preference types
DIB AIB Revealed preference type
Benevolent Benevolent Efficiency-loving (EL)
Benevolent Malevolent Inequality-loving (IL)
Malevolent Benevolent Inequality-averse (IA)
Malevolent Malevolent Spiteful (SF)
Note: This table shows how a choice sequence translates into the active agent’s willingness to pay (WTP) to increase/decrease the
passive agent’s payoff by TZS 1.
an individual’s choices in these domains as benevolent or malevolent. Benevolence
and malevolence are used to categorize subjects into four major distributional prefer-
ence types. An individual who makes benevolent choices in both domains is labeled
as “efficiency-loving” (EL) — that is, the decision-maker maximizes total payoffs. A
subject who chooses to switch to the asymmetric allocation early in both domains
reveals a preference for inequality; thus the label “inequality-loving” is used (IL).
In contrast, switching to the asymmetric allocation late or never in both domains
means that we classify the individuals as “inequality-averse” (IA). A subject with
malevolent choices in both domains is assigned to the “spiteful” preference type (SF).
At the beginning of the experiment, the instructions of the experiment and an ex-
ample choice list to illustrate the choices were read to all participants.15 In particular,
students were informed that the passive person was a randomly chosen participant
in the same session. Subsequently, student’s remaining questions were answered
personally by the team of enumerators.
It was made clear that if a student drew the distributional preference experiment
for payout at the end of the session, one of the ten items on the choice list would
be randomly chosen and realized. Due to random matching of active and passive
agents, apart from actively choosing allocations, each child was guaranteed to be a
passive agent for some other student. The passive payoff from the randomly matched
participant was added to the active payoff of the decision-maker, and this was made
15The experimental instructions were translated into Swahili and tested prior to the experiment.
The English version of the instructions can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 1: Distribution of distributional preferences by gender
Note: Distributional preferences based on willingness to pay (WTP) to increase the passive agent’s payoff in disad-
vantageous (DIB, y-axis) and advantageous (AIB, x-axis) domains. Left: boys (293 observations); right: girls (321
observations)
clear in the instructions.
5. Results
A. Preference Distribution and Peer Network Characteristics
The first step of the analysis is to document the prevalence of distributional prefer-
ence types in the sample. Figure 1 plots the metric willingness-to-pay measure to
increase the passive agent’s payoff in the DIB (y-axis) and AIB (x-axis) and assigns
preference types per quadrant. For most children, their choices can be clearly at-
tributed to one of the four broad preference types, defined by the graphs quadrants.
Only in the range between spiteful and inequality averse types do some subjects show
more nuanced preferences, as they reveal neutrality if advantaged and neutrality or
malevolence if disadvantaged. These types are consistent with kick-down or selfish
preferences (Kerschbamer, 2015). The visualization also highlights that, while fairly
balanced across the advantageous domain, choices in the disadvantageous domain
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Table 4: Distribution of distributional preferences
(1) (2) (3)
Children Boys Girls t-test
Efficiency-loving (EL) 14.5% 13.0% 15.9%
Inequality-loving (IL) 12.4% 10.9% 13.7%
Inequality-averse (IA) 30.6% 24.9% 35.8% ∗∗
Spiteful (SF) 42.5% 51.2% 34.6% ∗∗∗
WTP (DIB) > 0 (benevolence) 26.9% 23.9% 37.9%
WTP (AIB) > 0 (benevolence) 45.9% 29.6% 51.7% ∗∗∗
Observations 614 293 321
Notes: Columns 1, 2 and 3 of this table show summary statistics of distributional preferences of the whole sample of children and the
subsample of boys and girls. WTP denotes willingness to pay of a subject to increase (decrease) the payoff of the passive agent in the
disadvantageous (advantageous) inequality block.
are skewed toward malevolence.
Table 4 shows that a high percentage (42.5%) of children reveal spiteful behav-
ior in the experiment. Less than half of the subjects show either efficiency-loving
(14.5%) or inequality-averse (30.6%) preferences.16 A large share of students exhibit
malevolent behavior in either the DIB (73.1%) or the AIB (54.1%), meaning that
they sacrifice resources to improve their relative position. If advantaged, they choose
to preserve the inequality, and even more strongly, if disadvantaged, they decide to
equalize payoffs.17 Although Fehr et al. (2013) use a somewhat different experi-
mental design, the shares of revealed preference types from our experiment mirror
almost one-to-one the distribution of 8- to 9-year-olds in their study of Austrian
students. Compared with 12- to 13-year-old children in their sample, we document
approximately three times higher frequencies of spitefulness and three times lower
frequencies of efficiency-loving or altruistic types.
Distributional preferences vary significantly by gender. Girls are substantially
more likely to be inequality-averse (35.8% to 24.9%) and less likely than boys to
exhibit spiteful preferences (34.6 to 51.2%). This gender difference at a young age is
the result of more benevolent choices of girls for both disadvantageous and advanta-
geous allocations. In particular, when the allocation is in their favor (AIB), female
students are statistically significantly more willing to sacrifice resources in order to
16We dropped 36 observations from the sample because of inconsistent (double switching) or
erroneous (incomplete or ambiguous choices) answers.
17Children’s distributional preferences differ significantly from those of a comparable sample of
adults (362 parent couples recruited from eight randomly chosen primary schools in Dar es Salaam),
who participated in a related study conducted by one of the coauthors (see Table A.1 in Appendix
A). In particular, the efficiency-loving type is about 2.5 times less prevalent in the sample of children
(14.5% to 38.6%). Instead, adolescents show a high frequency of spiteful preference types (42.5%),
about 2.5 times the percentage of adults. Similar shares of the samples revealed inequality-loving
(12.4% to 13.7%) or inequality-averse (30.6% to 31.2%) preferences. This suggests that with age,
individuals adopt more efficiency-oriented preferences, rather than prioritizing their own absolute
and relative payoffs. These findings are consistent with the age-trends in other-regarding preferences
documented by, among others, Almås et al. (2010) and Sutter et al. (2018).
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Figure 2: Characteristics of peer networks
increase the passive agent’s payoff. In fact, 13.8% more girls do so in the advanta-
geous than in the disadvantageous domain, while for boys this difference amounts to
only 5.1%.
The peer network constructed from the three best friends of each child provides
information on the quantity and the types of peers. We define “friendship“ as a
unilateral- or bilateral link in the network. Figure 2 summarizes some of the main
characteristics of these networks. By design, our network measure limits out-degree
(naming a friend) to a maximum of three, which corresponds to the number of friends
that we elicited via the survey. Within the observable range, the distribution does not
have large tails of very unpopular or popular students (i.e., in-degree, being named
as a friend). The median number of peers is only slightly lower (5) than the mean
(5.6), and the standard deviation (2) is moderate. Almost every third friendship is
reciprocated. Not surprisingly for this age-group, friendship networks are extremely
segregated by the gender of students. In our sample, 77.5% of children have only
same-gender friends, and only 9% have more than one peer from the opposite sex in
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Figure 3: Correlation of distributional preferences at the school and within peer networks.
their peer networks.
The peer networks in the sample are dense and well connected. This implies
that each student could reach out to any other student via relatively few friendship
connections. There are also virtually no isolated peer networks, even taking into
account the segregation by gender. However, as we analyze and discuss further in
Section D, there are differences in popularity and centrality of children within their
networks.
Despite the focus on understanding whether and why peer networks are based
on distributional preferences, it is worth noticing that members of these networks
can exhibit similarities also in other characteristics. Graph (b) of Figure 2 shows
that students with high test scores also have high-performing friends (corr. 0.34∗∗∗).
Preference-based peer networks could reinforce peer correlations in school perfor-
mance through cooperation and social interaction based on distributional attitudes.
However, popular children do not seem to socialize more with peers who are part of
large networks themselves.
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B. Peer Correlations in Distributional Preferences
We start by exploring the link between preference types in peer networks by plotting
the frequency of observing pairs of children with identical preference types. Each
possible pair of children at a sample school is represented by an observation (dyad) in
the sample. Distinguishing between dyads of children that reported a friendship link
and those that simply attend the same school, we can separate the probabilities p(t)
and q(t) from our theoretical framework. qt represents the distribution of preference
types in the children’s broad social environment. In the absence of peer effects,
it represents the probability that two randomly selected children exhibit the same
preference type. If we observe a higher frequency of same-type dyads among those
children that report a friendship, p(t) is positive and friends are more likely to have
similar preferences.
Panel (a) in Figure 3 depicts these frequencies for the entire sample and for
subsamples of specific preference types. The distribution of types at the school is the
major factor of explaining dyads of same-type children. However, there are significant
differences in the distribution of these frequencies for dyads between friends and non-
friends, particularly for inequality-loving and spiteful preference types. Panel A of
Table 5 quantifies these differences in a probit regression framework. It confirms that
the higher correlation between types for friends persists, when school fixed effects
and individual characteristics of the child are included. If two randomly selected
children report a friendship, the likelihood of revealing the same preference type
increases by 7.9%. Inequality-loving and spiteful types account for a large share of
this relationship, with increases of 52% and 11.9%.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 zooms in on the probability p, which explains why observing
a randomly selected pair of children at a school is more likely to exhibit the same
preference type if they are friends. It presents the raw correlations between types
over all possible friendship dyads. For the overall relation between the categorical
types variable, the Cramer’s V measure of association is used. First, note that
types between non-friends at the same school are weakly correlated (0.029), which
means that q at a given school is slightly different than the overall distribution
of types in our full sample of all three schools. Second, the correlation between
types in dyads between non-friends and friends differs substantially and explains
why we observe more same-type dyads among friends. The overall higher correlation
(0.094) between types in friend-dyads is driven by significantly higher correlations
for inequality-loving (0.078) and spiteful types (0.137).
Next, we take a closer look at these correlations between types for friend-dyads by
controlling for observable child characteristics and uncovering some of the heterogene-
ity in preference peer networks using the following friendship dyad-level specification
with child i’s and peer d’s types.
1[type = t]i,d = α0 + α11[friend type = t]d + X
′
iδ + ǫi,d (3)
where 1[type = t] is a dummy variable for preference types t = {EL, IL, IA, SF} for
individual i in friendship d and 1[friend type] the corresponding peer type in dyad
d.
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Table 5: Correlation in distributional preference types
by preference type
Outcome: "Same Preference Type" All Types EL IL IA SF
(at dyad level) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probability of Same-type Dyad (p)
Friendship link 0.026∗∗ 0.0017 0.066∗∗∗ -0.021 0.050∗∗
(128,943 dyads) (0.010) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.002)
Outcome Mean 0.331 0.161 0.126 0.313 0.457
Panel B: Correlation in Types between Friends
Peer is same type 0.0001 0.056∗∗ -0.028 0.046∗
(2,600 dyads) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
Outcome Mean 0.148 0.130 0.297 0.424
Panel C: Correlation in Types by Degree of Friendship
Out-degree 0.00003 0.056∗∗ -0.035 0.046+
(1,630 dyads) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
In-degree 0.002 0.064∗ -0.038 0.037
(1,631 dyads) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025)
Reciprocal -0.004 0.085∗∗ -0.076∗ 0.011
(1,322 dyads) (0.039) (0.032) (0.035) (0.038)
Panel D: Correlation in Types by Gender of Child
Friend of same type × Boy 0.021 0.026 -0.031 0.055+
(2,600 dyads) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029)
Friend of same type × Girl -0.017 0.070∗ -0.044+ 0.033
(2,600 dyads) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from a probit regression of a friendship link (Panel A) or of a friend’s type (Panels B-D).
In Panel A the outcome is a binary variable equal to one if two children at a school exhibit the same preference type. Column 1 shows
the marginal effect on having the same preference type. Columns 2-5 report the results for subsamples of the child’s preference type
(EL = efficiency-loving, IL = inequality-loving, IA = inequality-averse, SF = spiteful). In Panels B-D the outcome variable is a binary
variable indicating whether a student is of a specific distributional preference type. Panel B reports overall correlations per type.
Panel C reports correlations by type for subsamples by degree centrality. Panel D reports correlations by type interacted with the
subject’s gender. In all panels standard errors are clustered at the child level, and controls include student’s school grade, household
size, religion, age, gender, and school fixed effects. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Controls X include school fixed effects, total number of friends, school grade,
age, gender, religion, and household size. Standard errors are clustered at the child
level. Panel B of Table 5 displays correlations in preference type between a child
and her or his close friends, i.e. for the subsample of dyads between friends. Each
cell corresponds to the marginal effect of the variable of interest from a probit model
estimation.18
18Notice that although we estimate separate specifications for all preference types, the simulta-
neous change of both outcome and explanatory variables does not warrant adjustments for multiple
hypotheses testing. Furthermore, because of the exhaustive nature of the outcome variable (one
regression for each possible preference type) and the clustering at child level, a joint estimation
(SUR) does not yield significant efficiency gains. In Table A.2 in Appendix A, we present results
from an alternative specification that regresses a child’s preference type on all four types of friends
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We find that being an inequality-loving or spiteful preference type is systemat-
ically related to the number of friends of these same types. An additional friend
of either of these two types significantly increases the likelihood of the child being
either inequality-loving (+4.6%) or spiteful (+4.6%). Overall, the evidence suggests
that peer effects are large for malevolent but not for benevolent choices, and thus
preference types, in both domains of our experiment. Additionally, even though
children reported their three best friends, peer networks at the school may in fact
be larger. This means that our measure of peer networks is truncated at out-degree
three (naming three friends), and positive estimates for probability p suggest that
the coefficients in Table 5 can be interpreted as a lower bound. Notice also that,
as unrecorded friendships are by design lower ranked than the recorded links, any
downward bias in our estimates is likely to be small.
Panel C of Table 5 shows that the peer correlations across distributional prefer-
ence types remain fairly constant when the directed nature of the network is taken
into account. Whether a child names a friend (out-degree), is named by another
child (in-degree), or both (reciprocal) makes little difference for preference type rela-
tions. Girls are slightly more likely to share reciprocal friendships, and therefore the
correlations are slightly higher for the inequality-loving type, which is more prevalent
in female students.
With distinct preference distributions for boys and girls, as well as relatively
segregated peer networks, one could think that peer correlations are gender-specific.
In panel D of Table 5, we therefore introduce heterogeneity by gender of children.
Overall, the patterns in peer correlations in distributional preferences are similar for
boys and girls. However, network results for spiteful types are strongly driven by
boys, with a marginal effect of 5.5%, while girls show higher correlations in inequality-
loving types (7%), although these gender-specific coefficients are not statistically
different from each other.
The correlations with same-type friends differentiated for the gender of friends
are similar to the overall results (see Table A.3 in Appendix A). On the one hand,
they suggest that peer correlation for spitefulness is larger for boys than girls, while
it is lower for inequality-loving types. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that social
networks in general are extremely segregated by gender, which is a main driver of
these results.
C. Ex Ante versus Ex Post Similarity
After isolating the probability p that a child exhibits the same preference type as a
friend, we turn to the underlying reasons for these peer correlations. Our measures
of correlations of types between friends suggest that social attitudes such as distri-
butional preferences already shape interactions between individuals at a young age.
Children may choose their close friends by, among other characteristics, matching
on distributional preferences (ex ante similarity). In this case, the networks that we
simultaneously. Wald-tests confirm the main result that inequality-loving and spiteful types are
correlated significantly with their friends’ types.
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Table 6: Ex ante versus ex post similarity
Preference Type EL IL IA SF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Exposure in Class
Same type friends in class 0.018 0.049+ -0.032 0.038
(0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
Same type friends not in class -0.040 0.051 -0.020 0.062+
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Panel B: Friendship Fixed Effects (569 best-friend pairs)
Friend of same type -0.006 0.023∗ -0.016+ 0.017+
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
FE logit p-values 0.659 0.088+ 0.15 0.034∗
Panel C: Ordinary Least Squares
Friend of same type -0.004 0.052∗ -0.029 0.046∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Logit p-values 0.921 0.007∗∗ 0.149 0.026∗
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600
Notes: Columns 1–4 of this table present alternative regression results for the likelihood of having the same-type friend. Panel A
reports results from a linear probability model estimated with friendship fixed effects. Each pair of best friends represents a fixed
effect and each pair is used only once in the estimation sample. P -values for the alternative fixed effects logit estimation are added.
Coefficients of the linear specification without fixed effects are shown for comparison in panel B. The outcome of all specifications
is a binary variable that determines whether a student is of a specific distributional preference type (EL = efficiency-loving, IL =
inequality-loving, IA = inequality-averse, SF = spiteful). Standard errors are clustered at best-friend pair and child levels. Controls
include total size of social network, student’s school grade, household size, religion, age, gender, and school fixed effects. Panel C
reports marginal effects from a probit estimation for which the preference types of friends are separated between those within the
same class and others from the same school but in a different class. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
measure are likely to be endogenous. On the other hand, children might be influ-
enced by the attitudes of their peers, such that distributional preferences could be
transmitted through friends (ex post similarity). When measuring social preferences
for children old enough to participate in experimental sessions, the elicited networks
are likely to be endogenous, as pupils have attended the same school for the previ-
ous five years. Therefore, the peer correlations represent the joint effect of selection
and preference transmission, and further attempts to distinguish between the two
channels seem warranted. In line with our theoretical framework, we attempt to
decompose p to selection s and transmission r.
First, using the network structure of the data in more detail, we find suggestive
evidence that both selection into networks and transmission play a significant role.
If correlations were driven by preference transmission, one should expect differential
correlations across the various dimensions of degree centrality. In particular, the
out-degree friends should show higher correlation in types than in-degree peers if
there is transmission, and actively naming a peer signals higher importance to or
influence on the child than being nominated passively. Selection based on distribu-
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tional preferences would lead to constant margins across degree centrality measures.
In our case, correlation coefficients of peers for different degree centrality subsamples
are not significantly different from each other, suggesting that selection plays a large
role in explaining (see Panel C of Table 5) social preference peer networks.
Second, we do not find that friends who were in the same class in the year prior to
the preference elicitation have differential correlation to the child’s type than friends
who simply go to the same school (see panel A of Table 6). The idea behind this
exercise is that a higher exposure to these friends in class would create a larger
correlation if preferences are transmitted ex post. However, class compositions in
the study context change every year, such that the exposure to same-class friends
might not be long enough.19
Third, the most relevant evidence to distinguish selection from transmission
comes from an attempt to control for observable and unobservable characteristics
that best (first-ranked) friends share with each other. We implement a best-friend
fixed effect specification at the friendship dyad level by augmenting equation 3. This
means that we construct best-friend pairs (b) and leverage the information on the
types of their unshared friends by controlling for best-friend dyad fixed effects φb.
If two students named each other as best friends reciprocally, the pair is kept only
once in the estimation sample.
1[type = t]i,d = β0 + β11[friend type = t]d + X
′
iδ + φb + ǫi,d,b (4)
The idea behind such an approach is that if close friends share characteristics that
lead to endogenous network formation, the fixed effects would capture such confounds
and one can identify the ex post peer effect from the pair’s unshared friends. The
regression results reported in panels B and C of Table 6 show that correlations for
the spiteful types, as well as for inequality-loving and averse children, survive the
inclusion of best-friend fixed effects. The reduction in point estimates suggests that
55.8% and 62.3% (ratio of FE to OLS estimates) of the peer correlations between
inequality-loving and spiteful types are explained by observable and unobservable
characteristics shared with the best friend. Given that preference transmission might
be larger between best friends compared with second-best or third-best friends and
that selection could be driven by factors not shared with the best friend, these results
have to be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, they suggest the presence of both a
high degree of selection and a positive, but smaller impact of preference transmission
in social preference peer networks.20
19Every year classes are newly formed by a quasi-random procedure with respect to preference
types. Specifically, depending on the grade point sum students are iteratively assigned to class A
or class B.
20As can be seen in Table 6, the results of the fixed effects and OLS estimation are robust to
using (conditional) logit specifications. Since marginal effects cannot be consistently estimated for
the logit fixed effects model, p-values are reported.
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D. Relative School Performance and Popularity
Besides providing a reference unit in which distributional preferences are formed,
changed or reinforced, peer networks may also have an indirect influence by refer-
encing an individuals economic or social position. Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) argue
that the aggregate relative position of the decision-maker matters for equity concerns
and reciprocity. Charness & Rabin (2002) explore Rawlsian preferences and find that
individuals tend to increase the payoffs of worst-off agents, but behave locally com-
petitive. Fisman et al. (2017) show that distributional preferences vary across the
income distribution. The adolescent individuals in our study do not differ in their
economic status, and we lack reliable income data for their parents. Therefore, we
investigate whether distributional preference are related to an individual’s position
in terms of school outcomes and popularity using detailed data on friend networks, as
well as administrative information on test scores. In particular, we test the hypoth-
esis that a higher relative position in terms of school outcomes and centrality within
the social network is related to more benevolent or more malevolent preferences.
Relative position in school performance is measured by the rank in standard 6 of
a specific school.21 Within the social network, we use the number of higher-ranked
friends, whether friends are on average higher-ranked, and a continuous variable of
the mean rank difference to capture the relative standing in performance of the child.
Popularity is assessed by measures for centrality widely used in network analysis.
The simplest one, in-degree centrality, denotes the number of incoming friendships,
meaning it counts the number of times that other students have named a child
as their friend. Taking it a step further, the Katz-Bonacich centrality addition-
ally captures aspects of popularity that go beyond the direct friends. It counts all
the shortest paths to reach any other friend node in the close and extended social
network, while discounting those connections farther away from the child. Finally,
the eigenvector centrality, in an extension to degree centrality, treats connections to
friends differentially by their respective importance in the network.22
Empirically, the correlation between relative position or popularity and distribu-
tional preferences is estimated using the following specification at the student level.
1[type = t]i = γ0 + γ1
{
rel. ranki
centralityi
}
+ X ′iβ + ǫi (5)
where 1[type = t] is a dummy variable for preference types t = {EL, IL, IA, SF}
for individual i and γ1 is the marginal effect of either relative school performance or
peer network centrality.
To correct the robust standard errors for correlation at the school level, we re-
port clustered standard errors and clustered wild bootstrap standard errors with the
Webb distribution (Webb, 2014; Cameron & Miller, 2015). The latter corrects for
overrejection bias due to the very low number of clusters (three schools). Table 7
21The rank is based on the grade point sum over all 10 subjects of the final national exam at the
end of standard 5, normalized by the total number of students at the school. The exam took place
approximately one month prior to the experimental sessions.
22For a detailed description of network summary and centrality statistics, see Jackson (2008)
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shows that especially the large prevalence of spiteful preference types is connected
to the relative position of students in terms of educational outcomes. Note that
the specification controls for the numeric school grade and therefore identifies the
relation relatively locally. Taking the estimates at face values, this implies that of
two students who ranked one standard deviation apart, the lower-ranked student is
about 29% more likely to have spiteful preferences. Ranking one standard deviation
lower than a peer increases this likelihood by 2.3%. Inequality- and efficiency-loving
types are negatively correlated with our measures of relative position, but this is not
statistically significant.
Although intuitive, the estimates do not prove a causal relationship between
relative position and spiteful distributional preferences because of potential reverse
causality. Students may perform worse than their peers because of their distribu-
tional preferences or because of observable or unobservable confounds. We rely on
survey information to tentatively argue against these alternative explanations (see
Table A.4 in Appendix A). To the extent that malevolent social preferences hinder
a student’s success at school, we do not find spiteful types to be less popular among
other students or show lower self-reported frequencies of studying or doing homework
with their friends. With respect to observable confounders, such as social and finan-
cial status of the child’s family, potential proxies we control for, such as household
size, religion and impatience, are not or negatively related to spitefulness.
Figure 4 depicts the social networks in one of the sample schools. It shows, on the
one hand, that preference types, varied by color, appear in clusters, and on the other
hand, that spiteful types (green) are dominant in popularity, represented by size.
Zooming in on this malevolent type, a central cluster located around several popular
influencers emerges. This pattern is supported weakly by panel B in Table 7, which
shows that all measures for centrality and popularity are related positively, although
not significantly, to the likelihood of being a spiteful type. This correlation is robust
to controlling for the total number of friends and therefore is not merely a reflection
of large numbers of this preference type. Popular students might feel less intrinsic
pressure to show benevolence towards others. In the spirit of reverse causality, an
alternative explanation might be that it requires spiteful types to establish and con-
serve hierarchies at school. Concerning this channel, Girard et al. (2015) provide
some evidence that preferences, such as risk, trust, and cooperativeness, can predict
an individual’s centrality in a newly formed social network. A look at the relation-
ship between popularity and choices in the DIB and AIB domains reveals that the
correlation operates mainly through malevolence, when the asymmetric allocation is
advantageous for the decision-making child. This suggests that these students are
likely to prefer establishing hierarchies in the school environment that are favorable
to them.
The distinction between benevolence in the DIB and AIB domains can also help
to understand why low ranks in outcomes and popularity show different correlations
to distributional preference types. Disadvantaged children in terms of school grades
may take the situation as exogenous — that is, not affected by their distributional
attitudes towards peers — and tackle the disadvantage through malevolent choices
in the DIB domain. Unpopular children may consider their social position malleable
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Table 7: Distributional preference and relative position
Preference Type EL IL IA SF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Relative Position in School
Rank in school 0.022 -0.307 -0.741∗ 0.997∗∗
(normalized at school level) (0.267) (0.229) (0.352) (0.369)
clustered p-values 0.935 0.180 0.111 0.092
Rank difference to friend (dyad level) -0.041 -0.029 0.005 0.065+
(normalized at school level) (0.027) (0.026) (0.034) (0.037)
Observations 2,744 2,744 2,744 2,744
Panel B: Social Hierarchy
In-degree 0.002 0.011 -0.013 0.0004
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
clustered p-values 0.842 0.119 0.323 0.973
Eigenvector centrality -0.072 0.530 -0.682+ 0.224
(0.418) (0.481) (0.361) (0.594)
clustered p-values 0.843 0.547 0.287 0.704
Katz-Bonacich centrality -0.177 -0.448 -0.182 0.807+
(0.492) (0.343) (0.463) (0.479)
clustered p-values 0.362 0.176 0.779 0.038∗
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 611 611 611 611
Notes: Columns 1–4 of this table report marginal effects from probit regressions of preference types regressed on a student’s relative
position (panel A) and social hierarchy (panel B). The outcome variable is a binary variable that determines whether a student is
of a specific distributional preference type (EL = efficiency-loving, IL = inequality-loving, IA = inequality-averse, SF = spiteful).
Standard errors are robust, and clustered p-values reflect standard errors clustered at school level (3), computed via wild bootstrap
using the Webb distribution. Controls include total size of social network, student’s school grade, household size, religion, age, gender,
and school fixed effects. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
and signal benevolent behavior.
6. Additional Results
While the main focus of this paper is to study the role of the close social environment
of peers in understanding distributional preferences of children, our study addition-
ally represents the first instance of experimentally eliciting these attitudes with the
given method in a low-income context. Not surprisingly, we find that the country
context also matters for other-regarding preferences in adolescence. As mentioned
earlier, although we use a different experimental design, the shares of revealed pref-
erences types in our sample of 12- to 13-year-old Tanzanian children resemble the
distribution of 8- to 9-year-olds in the sample of Austrian students studied by Fehr
et al. (2013). The gender gap in children’s distributional preferences is identical to
the shares of preference types among 8- to 9-year-olds in that study. Thus, it appears
as if a 2- to 3-year delay exists in the evolution of distributional preferences, though
individuals could be on different paths altogether. Interestingly, this delay corre-
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(a) All preference types
(b) Spiteful type
Figure 4: Degree centrality and preference types (Maarifa Primary School)
Notes: Efficiency-loving = blue, inequality-loving = orange, inequality-averse = pink, spiteful = green. Black circles
in Figure 4, panel A, denote individuals with missing preference measures; in Figure 4, panel B, they denote all
nonspiteful preference types. Figure 4, panel A, depicts all standard-6 students in the school, with colors and size
denoting preference types and degree centrality. Figure 4, panel B, displays the network for children of the spiteful
type.
sponds to the deficits in human capital formation in Sub-Saharan Africa compared
with developed countries. Bold et al. (2018) find that after 3.5 years of school, pri-
mary schoolchildren in Kenya and Mozambique have gathered knowledge of only 1.5
years’ effective learning. If economic underdevelopment is related to a low rate and
slow formation of benevolent other-regarding preferences, cooperation and growth
could be further affected — a hypothesis to be tested in future research.
It is worth mentioning that the broad and close social environment may interact
in determining preference formation at a young age. For example, peer networks
in low-income, poverty-prone contexts could have stronger influences on economic
behavior, given their role for providing crucial insurance and support in the lack of
efficient formal institutions, even at a young age.
This potential preference gap between low- and high-income contexts seems to
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persist over time. Results for comparable adults sampled in our low-income setting
also differ significantly from distribution of types in developed countries (see Figure
B.1 in Appendix B for the distribution of preferences in the adult sample). For
example, a study in Austria by Balafoutas et al. (2014), using the same design as
our study, shows up to twice as many efficiency-loving types and a significantly lower
occurrence of inequality-averse attitudes among adults. In fact, the distribution of
adult preference types in our sample is strikingly close to the findings of Fehr et al.
(2013) for 14- to 17-year-old high school students in a high-income setting. Again,
this observation warrants future research designed to address these aspects directly.
7. Conclusion
Previous literature in economics has documented that distributional preferences —
also called social preferences or other-regarding preferences — are important in ex-
plaining a number of economic decisions in the context of fostering cooperation, in-
creasing productivity, and improving political outcomes. How does peer influence in
early life shape these obviously important distributional preferences? In this paper,
we attempt to shed light on this research question using a lab-in-the-field (artefac-
tual) experiment. We recruited a sample of adolescents (aged 12-13) and let them
make ten binary choices between two payoff allocations between the decision-maker
(the active agent) and a randomly matched anonymous person from the same sample
(the passive agent). We then use these allocation patterns to categorize children into
efficiency-loving, inequality-loving, inequality-averse, and spiteful types. We also
collect detailed information on friendship networks and investigate the relationship
between distributional preferences of children and their peers.
Results suggest that a large percentage of children exhibit spiteful behavior
(42.5%) or equality-oriented (30.6%) preferences. This means that a large share of
students reveals malevolent behavior in their allocation decisions, i.e. they sacrifice
resources to improve their relative position. If advantaged, they choose to maintain
the inequality, and even more strongly, if disadvantaged, they opt to equalize payoffs.
There is also a clear difference between boys and girls in distributional preferences.
Girls tend to be more likely to be inequality-averse than boys and less likely to reveal
spiteful preferences.
The detailed friendship network data we collected allows us to uncover a signif-
icant correlation in distributional preferences within the peer networks. In particu-
lar, pairs of children linked by self-reported friendship are more likely to reveal the
same preference type. Conditional on a friendship link, children are alike with re-
spect to malevolent behavior toward others, especially in disadvantageous situations
(inequality-loving and spiteful types). A large fraction of this peer effect is driven
by selection into networks with the remaining correlation stemming from preference
transmission through peers. Furthermore, the relative position within a network is
related to preference types to a smaller extent than the network composition.
We think that our study offers several novel and relevant insights on distributional
preferences of adolescents and their peers. First, it provides a structured view on
the role of social networks in shaping adolescents’ distributional preferences. We
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show that distributional preferences types are assorted along friendship ties, at least
for some types. Second, our study can be considered as a relevant starting point
to study the emergence of reference groups that are at the heart of models of social
preferences, but have not been endogenized in these models so far. Third, we show
that there is a potential relationship between distributional preferences and one of
the most important outcomes at a young age, school performance.
Given the importance of distributional preferences for many aspects of life, we
regard it as an interesting task for future research to explore how early social pref-
erence networks shape group outcomes later in life. Our findings also speak to the
potential importance of exposing children to attitudes that differ from the prevalent
views of their close social environment. Children in a weak relative position or in a
peer network based on malevolent preferences may not evolve with age, or at least
not as quickly as others, towards exhibiting more benevolent other-regarding atti-
tudes. Tracking or reshuffling of classes at school may be a policy that can induce
exposure to other attitudes, while simultaneously changing relative positions within
the social environment.
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1. Additional Tables
Table 1: Revealed distributional preferences of adults
Adults Men Women
Efficiency-loving (EL) 38.63% 32.87% 44.41%
Inequality-loving (IL) 13.67% 15.04% 12.29%
Inequality-averse (IA) 31.10% 31.20% 31.01%
Spiteful (SF) 16.60% 20.89% 12.29%
WTP (DIB) > 0 52.31% 47.91% 56.70%
WTP (AIB) > 0 69.75% 64.07% 75.42%
Observations 717 359 358
Notes: WTP denotes a subject’s willingness to pay to increase (decrease) the payoff
of the passive agent in the DIB (AIB). Nine adults are dropped from the sample
because of inconsistent (double switching) or erroneous (incomplete or ambiguous
choices) answers.
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Table 2: Peer correlations in distributional preferences (alternative specification)
Preference Type EL IL IA SF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Friend is type 1 (baseline)
Friend is type 2 -0.012 0.058∗ -0.00004 -0.053
(0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.037)
Friend is type 3 0.014 0.029 -0.048+ 0.005
(0.022) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029)
Friend is type 4 -0.006 0.001 -0.035 0.035
(0.022) (0.021) (0.029) (0.030)
Wald test: type 2=type 3=type 4 1.53 12.44∗∗ 4.56 8.81∗
P -value 0.676 0.006 0.207 0.032
Mean 0.148 0.130 0.297 0.424
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from a probit regression of a child’s preference type on
the friend’s type. The outcome variable is a binary variable that indicates whether a student is of a
specific distributional preference type (EL = efficiency-loving, IL = inequality-loving, IA = inequality-
averse, SF = spiteful). Panel A reports overall correlations per type. Panel B reports correlations
by type for subsamples by degree centrality. Panel C reports correlations by type interacted with the
subject’s gender. Standard errors are clustered at child level, and controls include student’s school grade,
household size, religion, age, gender, and school fixed effects. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001.
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Table 3: The role of peers by gender
Preference Type EL IL IA SF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
By Gender of Peer:
Boys
Friend of same type 0.025 0.053+ -0.046+ 0.042
(0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.030)
Girls
Friend of same type -0.016 0.069∗ -0.044+ 0.032
(0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029)
Mean 0.148 0.130 0.297 0.424
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each cell shows the marginal effect of having a same-type friend in a probit
model estimation. The outcome is a binary variable that determines whether a
student is of a specific distributional preference type (EL = efficiency-loving, IL
= inequality-loving, IA = inequality-averse, SF = spiteful). Standard errors are
clustered at child level, and controls include total size of social network, student’s
grade, household size, religion, age, gender, and school fixed effects.+ p < 0.10, ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 4: Child characteristics by preference type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Types EL IL IA SF ANOVA
Study with friends 1.95 2.03 1.99 1.77 2.04 ∗
(days per week) (0.991) (1.055) (0.993) (1.053) (0.906)
Do homework with friends 1.56 1.40 1.72 1.49 1.63
(days per week) (1.137) (1.120) (1.180) (1.135) (1.127)
Play with friends 2.34 2.32 2.47 2.25 2.38
(days per week) (0.915) (0.929) (1.251) (0.999) (0.881)
Household size 5.35 5.47 5.28 5.28 5.37
(1.999) (1.913) (2.197) (1.847) (2.080)
Number of children in hh 2.62 2.89 2.45 2.56 2.61
(1.304) (1.465) (1.251) (1.215) (1.316)
Muslim 0.60 0.49 0.74 0.62 0.58 ∗
(0.491) (0.503) (0.443) (0.487) (0.495)
Observations 614 89 76 188 261
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2. Additional Figure
Figure 1: Distributional preference of adults
Spiteful
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Inequality-averse
Efficiency-loving
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Note: Distribution of social preferences based on willingness to pay (WTP) to increase the passive agent’s payoff in
disadvantageous (DIB, y-axis) and advantageous (AIB, x-axis) domains (717 observations).
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3. Choice List for Distributional Preferences Experiment
Figure 2: Choice List for Distributional Preferences Experiment (translated from Swahili)
 
 
 LEFT Decision RIGHT 
 You get Passive person gets You get Passive person gets 
1 2000 4000 O           O 2500 2500 
2 2400 4000 O           O 2500 2500 
3 2500 4000 O           O 2500 2500 
4 2600 4000 O           O 2500 2500 
5 3000 4000 O           O 2500 2500 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6 2000 1000 O           O 2500 2500 
7 2400 1000 O           O 2500 2500 
8 2500 1000 O           O 2500 2500 
9 2600 1000 O           O 2500 2500 
10 3000 1000 O           O 2500 2500 
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4. Instructions for Distributional Preferences Experiment
Start by reading the following instructions to the participants: We will now proceed
with the next part of today’s session. It consists of 10 decisions. You are matched
with another person of your age in today’s study. The identity of this person will
remain unknown to you. We will call the person matched with you “your passive
person” from now on. We will explain later, why this participant is called “passive
person”.
Each of your 10 decisions is a choice between the options LEFT and RIGHT.
Each option has consequences for how much money you and your passive person can
earn (show example choice).
Left Choice Right
You get Passive agent gets You get Passive agent gets
1900 3000 © © 2000 2000
In this example you are asked whether you prefer the alternative LEFT, in which
you get 1900 TZS and your passive person gets 3000 TZS, or the alternative RIGHT,
in which you earn 2000 TZS and your passive person gets 2000 TZS as well. You
will have to decide for one of the two alternatives by crossing the circle next to the
alternative. Are there any questions?
All in all, you will make 10 such decisions. Your earnings from this part will be
determined as follows:
If you draw this part for payout, one decision is chosen randomly by drawing
a numbered card from 1 to 10. The alternative that was selected in the decision
situation will be paid out. For instance, in the decision situation described above,
if you chose the alternative RIGHT, you would receive 2000 TZS as active person,
whereas your passive person would receive 2000 TZS as passive person.
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In the same way your passive person receives earnings from your decision without
doing anything for it. At the end of today’s session you will be informed about which
part of the session and which of your 10 decisions determines your earnings. Impor-
tantly, you are also a passive person for one of the other participants. Again, that
person does not know your identity. You will get additional payout from your role
as passive person according to that participant’s choices. Are there any questions?
5. Comment on Preanalysis Plan
There are two main departures of this paper from the registered preanalysis plan: (i)
The present study focuses purely on distributional preferences, using children’s time
preferences only as a control variable in some of the specifications. This is mainly
due to presentational considerations. Time preferences were collected as planned
and may feature in additional studies. (ii) The paper is focuses mainly on peer and
network effects. While we attempted to collect preference measures for the parents
of all children, this was hindered by high rates of orphans and children who do not
live with both biological parents in their current homes in Dar es Salaam. The
resulting sample of parents of the sample children is too small for robust inference
on intergenerational preference correlations that we wanted to address.
